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MODERNIZING THE FAIR AND EQUITABLE 
TREATMENT STANDARDS IN THE ENERGY 
CHARTER TREATY 
Sydney Thurman-Baldwin* 
As oil and gas continue to be hot commodities for national 
economies, the number of international arbitrations in the energy 
sector has continued to rise in recent years. As the utilization of 
International Arbitration continues to rise in Energy disputes, so 
does the invocation of The Energy Charter Treaty (“ECT”).  The 
ECT promotes inter-governmental cooperation with contracting 
parties in the energy sector through its provisions on investment 
protection, provisions on trade, transit of energy, energy 
efficiency, environmental protection and dispute 
resolution.  These provisions are considered to be the cornerstone 
of the treaty, fostering a ‘level playing field’ for foreign 
investments in the energy sector and minimizing the non-
commercial risks associated with such investments, all pursuant 
to the Minimum Standards for Investment Protection described in 
Section 10(1) of the ETC, such as Fair and Equitable Treatment 
(FET).  However, such standards are overbroad and leave room 
for numerous interpretations.  Though likely intended to 
strengthen the application of FET, overbreadth dampens the effect 
of the ETC’s FET provision, as it fails to uniformly instruct both 
parties and tribunals on the parameters of FET under the Treaty 
and could ultimately hinder the FET provided to foreign investors. 
This paper seeks to address ways in which Article 10(1) of the 
ECT, on Fair and Equitable Treatment, can be modified to better 
protect foreign investments.  The first part of this paper will 
discuss a brief history of this ETC.  The second part of this paper 
will discuss Article 10(1) of the ETC as it pertains to FET and its 
applicability in practice, by focusing on three recent Spanish 
cases: (1) Masdar Solar & Wind Cooperatief U.A. v. The 
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Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/1; (2) Charanne B.V., 
Construction Investments S.A.R.L. v Spain, SCC Arbitration No.: 
062/2012; and (3) Eisner Infrastructure Limited and Energia 
Solar Luxembourg S.a.r.l. v Spain, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/13/36. The paper concludes by offering suggestions for 
modernizing Article 10(1), using the recent Spanish cases as a 
model.  
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As oil and gas continue to be hot commodities for national 
economies, the number of international arbitrations in the energy sector 
has continued to rise in recent years. By the end of 2019, ICSID reported 
that 42% of cases administered by ICSID arose from the energy sector, 
which was more than any other sector.1 As the utilization of International 
Arbitration continues to rise in Energy disputes, so does the invocation of 
The Energy Charter Treaty (“ECT”)2.  The ECT was established to 
provide a multilateral framework for energy cooperation.  Pursuant to 
Article 2 of the Energy Charter Treaty, its purpose is to ‘promote long-
term co-operation in the energy field, based on complementarities and 
mutual benefits, in accordance with the objectives and principles of the 
 
1 International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes. 2019. 2019 ICSID Annual 
Report : Excellence in Investment Dispute Resolution. Washington, DC: ICSID. © ICSID. 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/32591 License: CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 
IGO. (In the 2019 Fiscal Year, the extractives and energy sectors (collectively “the Energy 
Sector”) accounted for the largest share of cases, in which 21%  involved the oil, gas and 
mining industry, and 21% involved electric power and other energy sources). 
2 See, e.g., International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes. 2016. The ICSID 
Caseload Statistics: Special Focus, European Union.  Washington, DC: 
ICSID.  https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%2
0EU%20(English)%20Updated%20June%2013%202016%20Final.pdf.   (“ Of the 93 
ICSID cases involving an EU member State, 42% were based on the State’s consent to 
arbitrate in the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT)”).  
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Treaty.3 The ECT promotes inter-governmental cooperation with 
contracting parties in the energy sector through its provisions on 
investment protection, provisions on trade, transit of energy, energy 
efficiency, environmental protection and dispute resolution4. These 
provisions are considered to be the cornerstone of the treaty, fostering a 
‘level playing field’ for foreign investments in the energy sector and 
minimizing the non-commercial risks associated with such investments,5 
all pursuant to the Minimum Standards for Investment Protection 
described in Section 10(1) of the ETC, such as Fair and Equitable 
Treatment (FET).  However, such standards are overbroad and leave room 
for numerous interpretations.  Though likely intended to strengthen the 
application of FET, overbreadth dampens the effect of the ETC’s FET 
provision, as it fails to uniformly instruct both parties and tribunals on the 
parameters of FET under the Treaty and could ultimately hinder the FET 
provided to foreign investors.  
Modernization of the Energy Charter Treaty’s Article 10(1) on 
Fair and Equitable Treatment would strengthen protection of foreign 
investments under the Treaty.  The first part of this paper will discuss a 
brief history of this ETC.  The second part of this paper will discuss Article 
10(1) of the ETC as it pertains to FET and its applicability in practice, by 
focusing on three recent Spanish cases: (1) Masdar Solar & Wind 
Cooperatief U.A. v. The Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/1; 
(2) Charanne B.V., Construction Investments S.A.R.L. v Spain, SCC 
Arbitration No.: 062/2012; and (3) Eisner Infrastructure Limited and 
Energia Solar Luxembourg S.a.r.l. v Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/36.  
Third, I will conclude the paper by offering suggestions for modernizing 
Article 10(1), using the recent Spanish cases as a model. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The first international arbitration invoking the ECT, AES v. Hungary 
I, was registered on 25 April 2001, three years after the ECT entered into 
force.6 The first award followed in December 2003, in Nykomb v. Latvia.7  
By 2013, the number of new arbitrations quadrupled from four initiated in 
 
3 Energy Charter Treaty art. 2, Dec. 17, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 373 [hereinafter ECT] 
4 See generally ECT. 
5 Kaj Hobér, Investment Arbitration and the Energy Charter Treaty, Journal of 
International Dispute Settlement, Feb. 3, 2010, at 153, 155. 
6 See AES Summit Generation Ltd. v. Republic of Hungary (Gr. Brit. v. Hung.), ICSID Case 
No. ARB/01/04, Settlement (Jan. 3, 2002).  
7 Nykomb Synergetics Tech. Holding AB v. Latvia, SCC Case No. 118/2001, Award (Dec. 
16, 2003).  
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2012 to 16, reaching a peak in 2015 with 25 cases.8  While this figure fell 
in 2016, the ECT has remained the most frequently invoked investment 
agreement in international arbitration cases.9 Today, 87 countries and 
international organizations have signed the ECT, making it the most 
frequently invoked international investment treaty. It is the only 
multinational treaty specifically dealing with investment issues in the 
energy industry.10 
The widespread usage of the ETC highlights the urgency to ensure that 
the treaty is in fact meeting its intended goals.  In January 2017, several 
experts from the industry, governments, legal circles and academics (in 
addition to officials from UNCITRAL and UNCTAD) discussed the 
investment protection standards under the ECT, concluding that some 
particular issues could benefit from additional clarification.11  One such 
aspect frequently noted as ripe for modernization and subsequent 
clarification was the provision on Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET) 
cited in Article 10(1) of the ETC.12   
Fair and equitable treatment is the most frequently invoked protection 
in claims under the investment treaties.13  The FET standard varies from 
case to case and “depends on the interpretation of specific facts for its 
content”14 and the full set of circumstances.  At its core, FET protects the 
Parties’ legitimate expectations.15  It also provides protection against 
 
8 Global Arb. Rev., The Guide to Energy Arbitrations n.9 (J. William Rowley et al. eds., 
2nd ed. 2017) (“As reported by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), and summarized by the Energy Charter Secretariat: International Energy 




10 CRINA BALTAG, THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY: THE NOTION OF INVESTOR (Wolters 
Kluwer 2012). 
11 Energy Charter Secretariat. "Decision of the Energy Charter Conference: Modernization 




13 De Brabandere, E. (2017). Fair and Equitable Treatment and (Full) Protection and 
Security in African Investment Treaties Between Generality and Contextual Specificity. 
The Journal of World Investment & Trade, 530–555. https://doi.org/10.1163/22119000-
12340050. 
14 Biwater Gauff v. Tanzania (Gr. Brit. v. Tanz.), ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award, ¶ 
593 (July 24, 2008) (quoting PETER T. MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND 
THE LAW 625 (Oxford University Press, 1995)).  
15 United Nations Treaty on Trade and Development. "Fair and Equitable Treatment: 
UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II." unctad.org, United 
Nations, 2012, unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d5_en.pdf. 90. 
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procedural impropriety, denial of justice and discrimination.16  States’ 
measures and actions are assessed objectively.17  Subjective unilateral 
expectations of individual investors and findings of bad faith are both 
irrelevant to tribunal determination.18  Generally, the application of FET 
in International Law is fact-specific and requires an in-depth factual 
analysis to assess applicable standards of the contracting parties.19  Though 
most BITs provide for FET, some leave the standard wholly undefined20, 
while others relate FET to the minimum standards of treatment under 
customary international law.21  A strong FET provision prevents 
inconsistent administrative acts.22 The overbroad nature of the Energy 
Charter Treaty’s FET provision is problematic because the exact scope and 
meaning of Fair and Equitable Treatment as it applies to the Treaty are 
absent. Such void leaves room for diminished application and subsequent 
violation. 
II. FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT UNDER THE ECT 
 
The use of the term “fair and equitable treatment” is not one-size-fits 
all.  Instead, the legal result is largely dependent on the facts of each case 
as they apply to the governing treaty.23  As such, there is extensive debate 
 
16 Id. 
17 American Manufacturing & Trading, Inc. (AMT) (US) v. Republic of Zaire, ICSID case 
No. ARB/93/1 Award, 21 February, 1997, reprinted in 36 International Legal Materials 
1531 (1997). 
18 Id. 
19 Cf. T. Wälde, Investment Arbitration under the Energy Charter Treaty: An Overview of 
Key Issues, Transnational Dispute Management 1 (2004), http://www.transnational-
dispute-management.com/samples/freearticles/tv1-2-article224bhtm. 
20 See, e.g., United States-Argentina BIT, Arg.-U.S., art. 2(2)(a), Nov. 14, 1991, S. TREATY 
DOC. NO 103-2. 
21 See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement, art. 1105(1), Can.-Mex.-U.S., Dec. 
17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605, 639-40 (entered into force Jan 1, 1994) (“Each Party shall accord 
to investments of another Party Treatment in accordance with international law, including 
fair and equitable treatment.”). Of note, this provision was amended in 2001, when the 
NAFTA Free Trade Commission, acting under NAFTA Article 1131, issued a binding 
interpretation of NAFTA Article 1105(1). Id. The binding interpretation specifically 
highlighted that (1) the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of 
aliens is the minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to foreign investors and (2) the 
concepts of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ and ‘full protection and security’ do not require 
treatment in addition to or beyond what is required by customary international law 
minimum standard treatment of aliens. 
22 See PSEG Global Inc. v. Republic of Turkey (U.S. v. Turk.), ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5, 
Award, ¶¶ 247, 248 (Jan. 19, 2007). 
23 Stephen Vasciannie, The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International 
Investment Law and Practice, 1999 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 122, 127.  
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surrounding the interpretation of FET and how the provision should be 
considered in the ECT.  The ECT guarantees fair and equitable treatment 
(FET) to protected investments.24  However, arbitral tribunals have 
repeatedly stressed that a judgment of what is fair and equitable cannot be 
reached in the abstract.  Instead, FET standards are dependent on the 
language of their binding treaties and the specifics of the case.25  
In accordance with the language of Article 10(1), tribunals considering 
the ECT’s FET protection have recognized a litany of components, such 
as contracting parties’ obligations to: act consistently and 
transparently26; comply with due process27; and, for state actors, ensure 
stable and equitable conditions.28  However, some tribunals have found 
that a FET breach is only valid if the state’s acts or omissions are 
‘manifestly unfair or unreasonable, such as would shock, or at least 
surprise a sense of juridical propriety.’29  The latter is a much broader 
interpretation of FET.  Such inconsistent application amongst tribunal 




24 See ECT, supra note 3, at art. 10(1). 
25 ADC Affiliate Ltd. v. Republic of Hungary (Cyprus v. Hung.), ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/16, Award, ¶ 44 (Oct. 2, 2006); Petrobart Ltd. v. Kyrgyz Republic, SCC Arb. No. 
126/2003, Final Award (2005); Noble Ventures v. Romania (U.S. v. Rom.), ICSID Case 
No. ARB/01/11, Award, ¶ 181 (Oct. 12, 2005); MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. v. Republic of Chile 
(Malay. v. Chile), ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Award, ¶ 109 (May 25, 2004); Mondev Int’l 
Ltd. v. United States (Can. v. U.S.), ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award, ¶ 118 (Oct. 
11, 2002); Waste Management v. Mexico (U.S. v. Mex.), ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, 
Award, ¶ 99 (Apr. 30, 2004) (cited in GAMI Investments v. Mexico (U.S. v. Mex.), 
UNCITRAL, Award, ¶ 96 (Nov. 15, 2004)); CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic 
(Neth. v. Czech), UNCITRAL, Partial Award, ¶336 (Sept. 13, 2001). 
26 Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary (Belg. v. Hung.), ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, and Liability, ¶ 7.74 (Nov. 30, 2012); 
(“Stressing that ‘the reference to transparency can be read to indicate an obligation to be 
forthcoming with information about intended changes in policy and regulations that may 
significant affect investments, so that the investor can adequately plan its investment and, 
if needed, engage the host State in dialogue about protecting its legitimate expectations’”); 
see also Mamidoil Jetoil Greek Petroleum Products Société S.A. v. Republic of Albania 
(Greece v. Alb.), ICSID Case No. ARB/11/24, Award, ¶ 616 (Mar. 30, 2015); Plama 
Consortium Ltd. v. Republic of Bulgaria (Cyprus v. Bulg.), ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, 
Award, ¶ 178 (Aug. 27, 2008); Mohammad Ammar Al-Bahloul v. Republic of Tajikistan, 
SCC Arb. No. V (064/2008), Partial Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶¶ 183-84 (2008).  
27 Mamidoil, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/24 at ¶ 613; Electrabel, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19 
at ¶ 7.74.  
28 Electrabel, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19 at ¶ 7.74.  
29 AES Corporation v. Republic of Kazakhstan (U.S. v. Kaz.), ICSID Case No. ARB/10/16, 
Award, ¶ 314 (Nov. 1, 2013). 
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a. FET under the ECT: In Theory 
Article 10 of the ECT provides a complex provision on FET that also 
incorporates constant protection and security, the prohibition of 
unreasonable or discriminatory measures to treatment required by 
international law, and to the observance of contractual obligations.  
Specifically, Article 10(1) provides that: 
 
‘[e]ach Contracting Party shall, in accordance with the 
provisions of this Treaty, encourage and create stable, 
equitable, favorable and transparent conditions for 
Investors of other Contracting Parties to make 
Investments in its Area. Such conditions shall include a 
commitment to accord at all times to Investments of 
Investors of other Contracting Parties fair and equitable 
treatment. Such Investments shall also enjoy the most 
constant protection and security and no Contracting Party 
shall in any way impair by unreasonable or 
discriminatory measures their management, 
maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal. In no case shall 
such Investments be accorded treatment less favorable 
than that required by international law, including treaty 
obligations. Each Contracting Party shall observe any 
obligations it has entered into with an Investor or an 
Investment of an Investor of any other Contracting Party. 
treatment. 30 
i. FET in the language of the ECT 
In theory, the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), like most 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs), commands Fair and Equitable 
Treatment (FET).  However, Article 10(1) of the ECT embeds the standard 
of FET into a complex provision that also refers to constant protection 
and security, the prohibition of unreasonable or discriminatory measures 
to treatment required by international law, and to the observance of 
contractual obligations. The first sentence of Article 10(1) is a general 
statement regarding the favorable investment climate that contracting 
parties are to maintain for investments protected by the ECT, while the 
next sentence of Article 10(1) explains that such favorable conditions 
‘shall include a commitment to accord at all times to Investments of 
Investors …fair and equitable treatment’.  A provision that separately 
provides for FET and for treatment required by international law suggests 
 
30 ECT, supra note 2, at art. 10(1), (emphasis added). 
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that the provision is not to be reasonably interpreted as meaning that FET 
is the same as the treatment required by international law as it makes the 
second sentence redundant.  Arbitral practice has suggested FET to mean 
good faith, protection of legitimate expectations, due process, 
proportionality, etc.31 
ii. FET in International Law: VCLT and ICSD 
 
There is no doctrine of precedent in international arbitration law. 
While arbitral tribunals may in general seek to act consistently with each 
other, in the end each tribunal must exercise its competence in accordance 
with the applicable law, which will by definition be different for each BIT 
and respondent State.32 The VCLT and The Convention on the Settlement 
of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) are two key International Legal texts 
tribunals use to guide and interpret the FET standard.33   
The VCLT has become customary international law and provides 
basic rules to guide Tribunals in the treaty interpretation.  Further, the 
VCLT “ha[s] also been repeatedly accepted by investment arbitration 
tribunals as constituting rules of interpretation which are binding on them 
in the interpretations of investment treaties, whether by virtue of being 
directly binding on the parties to the BIT as treaty rules, or as customary 
international law.”34  
The rules for interpreting treaties, including investment treaties, are 
set out in article 31 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties.39 Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention provides:  
 
31 See Hobér, supra note 3, at 153-90 (quoting MTD, Equity Sdn. Bhd. v Republic of Chile 
(Malay. v. Chile), ICSID Case No ARB/01/7, Award (May 25, 2004)). See also CMS Gas 
Transmission Comp. v. Argentine Republic (U.S. v. Arg.), ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, 
Award (May 12, 2005); Waste Management, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/3; Tecnicas 
Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States (Spain v. Mex.), ICSID Case 
No. ARB (AF)/00/2, Award (May 29, 2003); Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States 
(U.S. v. Mex.), ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/97/1, Award (Aug. 30, 2000); Azinian v. 
United Mexican States (U.S. v. Mex.), ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/97/2, Award (Nov. 1, 
1999). 
32 SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines (Switz. v. 
Phil.), ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 97 (Jan. 29, 2004). 
33 IOANA TUDOR, THE FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT STANDARD IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW (Oxford University Press, 2008).  
34 Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic (U.S. v. Arg.), ICSID Case No. ARB 01/12, Award, 
¶ 360 (July 14, 2006) (“The Tribunal confirmed that the BIT should be interpreted in 
accordance with the VCLT”).   
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A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and 
in the light of its object and purpose.35  
Various tribunals have agreed that the ordinary meaning of “fair” and 
“equitable” is “just”, “even-handed”, “unbiased”, “legitimate”36. 
However, as one tribunal has noted, these definitions do not take one very 
far because they replace “fair” and “equitable” with terms of almost equal 
vagueness.37 
Experts also look to Article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention due to its 
references on “applicable law in the field of ICSID arbitral disputes”38.  
Art. 42(1) of the ICSID Convention provides:  
 
The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with 
such rules of law as may be agreed by the parties. In the 
absence of such agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the 
law of the Contracting State party to the dispute 
(including its rules on the conflict of laws) and such rules 
of international law as may be applicable.41  
 
The expression “and such rules of international law as may be applicable” 
in Art. 42(1) of the ICSID Convention gives Tribunals the choice to use 
any interpretation supported by international law.  This discretion becomes 
overbroad when the treaty in question, as is the case with the ECT, fails to 
provide which international law rules may be applicable.    
b. FET under the ECT: In Practice 
In practice, compliance with the FET provision outlined in Article 
10(1) of the ECT is difficult to measure.  Courts are reluctant to rule on 
the basis of Article 10(1) even when the dispute is centered around a lack 
of Fair and Equitable Treatment39.   Even tribunals that do rule on the basis 
of a lack of Fair and Equitable Treatment treat the ETC’s FET provision 
in different ways.  On Fair and Equitable Treatment, the Arbitral Tribunal 
 
35 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3a10.html (accessed Jan. 26, 2020). 
36 Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic (Ger. v. Arg.), ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award, 
¶ 290 (Feb. 6, 2007); Saluka Investments B.V. v. Czech Republic (Neth. v. Czech), 
UNICTRAL, Partial Award, ¶ 297 (Mar. 17, 2006); Azurix Corp., ICSID Case No. ARB 
01/12 at ¶ 360. 
37 Saluka Investments, UNICTRAL at ¶ 297.. 
38TUDOR, supra note 23, at 9  
39 See Nykomb, SCC Case No. 118/2001; see also Mohammad Ammar Al-Bahloul, SCC 
Arb. No. V (064/2008) at ¶¶ 183-84. But see Petrobart Ltd., SCC Arb. No. 126/2003 at 45, 
82. 
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in Petrobart v. The Kyrgyz Republic suggested that FET was an 
overarching principle that embraced all standards mentioned in the article 
and “[did] not find it necessary to analyze the Kyrgyz Republic’s action in 
relation to the various specific elements in Article 10(1) of the Treaty.”40 
Instead, the tribunal noted that Article 10, “in its entirety is intended to 
ensure fair and equitable treatments of investments.”  Other Tribunals, as 
was the case in Mohammad Ammar Al-Bhloul v. Republic of Tajikistan 
(SCC Case No. V064/2008), completely ignore the purposes and 
objectives of the ECT, even though the Vienna Convention of the Law of 
Treaties (VCLT) mandates that the treaties be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning of the terms of their context and in 
light of the treaty’s object and purpose41.  In Mohammad Ammar Al-
Bhloul, the Tribunal instead opted to rely on various non-ECT case law 
and concluded that the provision on Fair and Equitable Treatment simply 
meant that a host State is obliged to act "in an open matter and consistent 
with commitments it has undertaken" 42.  Three recent cases involving the 
Kingdom of Spain, (1) Masdar Solar & Wind Cooperatief U.A. v. The 
Kingdom of Spain; (2) Charanne B.V., Construction Investments S.A.R.L. 
v Spain; and (3) Eisner Infrastructure Limited and Energia Solar 
Luxembourg S.a.r.l. v Spain43, further highlight the various treatment 
tribunals give to the FET provision of the ECT and the Charter’s need to 
define FET. 
i. Charanne B.V., Construction Investments S.A.R.L. v 
Spain 
 
The Tribunal in Charanne found that a change in regulatory regime 
was within the powers of the host state and that there was not a sufficient 
legitimate expectation created by Spain such that it would be considered 
unfair to the investor, Construction Investments44.  A state’s changing of 
regimes can be overridden if the investor holds legitimate expectations that 
were generated as a specific commitment towards the investor45. The 
tribunal found that there was not a substantial commitment that incentives 
 
40 Petrobart Ltd., SCC Arb. No. 126/2003 at 82.  
41 Mohammad Ammar Al-Bahloul, SCC Arb. No. V (064/2008). 
42 Id. at ¶¶ 175-79  
43 Masdar Solar & Wind Cooperatief U.A. v. Kingdom of Spain (Neth. v. Spain), ICSID 
Case No. ARB/14/1, Award (May 16, 2018); Eiser Infrastructure Ltd. v. Spain (Gr. Brit. 
v. Spain), ICSID Case No. ARB/13/36, Award (May 4, 2017); Charanne B.V. v. Spain, 
SCC Arb. No.: 062/2012, Award (Jan. 21, 2016) ¶ 
44 Charanne B.V., SCC Arb. No. 062/2012, Award (Jan. 21, 2016) at ¶ 539. 
45 Id. at ¶ 489-490. 
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to renewable energy could not be altered, therefore causing the case to fall 
short of meeting the Tribunal’s FET standards.46   
To come to this determination, the tribunal considered an investor’s 
legitimate expectations to be ‘a relevant factor’ to the determination of 
FET, derived from good faith principles under customary international 
law.47 The decision in Charanne came down to two different schools of 
thought.  The majority in that case held that only specific commitments 
can give rise to legitimate expectations while the dissent argued that, if 
investors were relying on general law as the source for their legitimate 
expectations, they would have to prove that they had undertaken sufficient 
due diligence to understand the legal system.48 
The majority reasoned that ‘a State cannot induce an investor to make 
an investment generating legitimate expectations, to later ignore the 
commitments that had generated such expectations’.49 Ultimately, the 
tribunal found in favor of the state on the basis that the State had a right to 
change the incentives on basis of sovereign right and used other standards 
of FET rather than framing its analysis on Article 10(1) of the ECT.50  
ii. Masdar Solar & Wind Cooperatief U.A. v. The Kingdom 
of Spain  
In Masdar, the tribunal at the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID) found Spain to be in breach of the fair and 
equitable treatment (FET) standards under Article 10(1) of the Energy 
Charter Treaty (ECT).51  Masdar, a Dutch company  constituted in the 
Netherlands, contended that, by a series of disputed measures introduced 
between 2012 and 2014, Spain abolished its Royal Decree 661 of 2007 
(“RD661/2007”) regime, which stimulated investment in the renewable 
energy sector, and introduced a much less favorable regime, which applied 
to those installations commissioned under the RD661/2007 regime alike.52  
Under RD661/2007, renewable energy generators would benefit from a 
premium set by the Spanish government above the wholesale market 
price.53 
Basing its argument off of Charanne, Masdar argued that the 
enactment of the disputed measures led to the dismantling of the regime 
under RD661/2007 and that the stability promised was the basis of which 
 
46 Id. at ¶ 492-499. 
47 Id. at ¶ 486. 
48 See Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51Masdar Solar & Wind Cooperatief U.A., ICSID Case No. ARB/14/1. 
52 Id. at ¶ 288-291. 
53 Id. at ¶ 454-460. 
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Masdar made is investments.54  Spain countered this argument by stating 
that stabilization, offered in provisions or otherwise, cannot create 
legitimate expectations for investors.55 
While the tribunal in Masdar ultimately found that the investor had 
undertaken the due diligence necessary to understand the legal system and 
bring a claim of legitimate expectations based on general law, this finding 
was only based on Article 10(1) after exhausting other schools of 
thought.56  Again, citing Charanne, the tribunal found that a specific 
commitment existed in the form of a resolution issued by Spain and 
addressed specifically to each of the operating companies.57  The existence 
of specific commitments between contracting parties and general 
commitments, which both gave rise to legitimate expectations, caused the 
tribunal to avoid ruling with either school of thought referenced in 
Charanne.58   
The tribunal in Masdar ultimately affirmed that a state is in fact at 
undisputed liberty to amend its legislation and that FET could not include 
economic and legal stability.59  Further, foreign investors could not 
legitimately expect such stability from the terms of the contract unless the 
terms were explicitly and directly extended to investors.60  However, the 
tribunal in Masdar only considered the FET standards of Article 10(1) of 
the ECT after noting the existence of specific and general commitments 
and coming to a roadblock on how to reach its decision.61  Rather than 
utilizing Article 10(1) of the ECT for its intended purpose, the tribunal in 
Masdar only consulted the ETC’s provision on FET after exhausting other 
options.    
 
iii. Eisner Infrastructure Limited and Energia Solar Luxembourg 
S.a.r.l. v Spain  
 
The tribunal in Eisner Infrastructure Limited and Energia Solar 
Luxembourg S.a.r.l. v Spain62 found in favor of the investor on legitimate 
expectations and fair and equitable treatment standards.  In the decision, 
the tribunal reiterated that a state has full regulatory powers, so long as the 
state’s powers do not abrogate its fair and equitable treatment obligations 
 
54 Id. at ¶ 348-350, 501-503. 
55 Id. at ¶ 469-472, 479. 
56 Id. at ¶ 508-522. 
57 Id.  
58 Id.  
59 Id. at ¶ 481-522. 
60 Id.  
61 Id.  
62Eiser Infrastructure Ltd., ICSID Case No. ARB/13/36. 
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towards investors63. Thus, any changes made should take into account the 
circumstances of existing investments made in reliance on the prior 
regime.  
In Eiser, the tribunal accepted that the regulatory change was so 
radical and fundamental that it affected the financial fundamentals of the 
investors and far surpassed the benefits envisioned at the time of the 
investment.64  The ECT was found to protect investors against total and 
unreasonable changes.65  While states are allowed to make changes, the 
changes should not disrupt the fundamental stability and essential 
characteristics of the legal regime relied upon by investors in making long-
term investments in the state.  The tribunal in Eisner applies Article 10(1) 
directly to the fair and equitable treatment claims, noting that “[the ECT] 
Article 10(1) obligation to accord investors fair and equitable treatment 
provides the most appropriate legal context for assessing the complex 
factual situation presented.”66  The tribunal further notes that a host state 
should avoid radical amendments on key characteristics of the investment 
that were relied upon by investors, as such radical changes could constitute 
a breach of the FET standards.67  
III. CONCLUSION 
While alternative sources to interpret FET standards can be derived 
from common sources of international law, such as the VCLT and the 
ICSID Convention, modernizing Article 10(1) of the ECT to include 
definitive language on FET under the Treaty would prove useful to 
arbitration tribunals and contracting parties.  A definition of what 
constitutes FET under the Treaty would minimize confusion, increase 
tribunals’ willingness to interpret FET under the guise of the Treaty and 
yield a more consistent interpretation of FET as it relates to the ECT.  Only 
through proper interpretation can the ECT truly serve its purpose of 
‘promot[ing] long-term co-operation in the energy field, based on 
complementarities and mutual benefits, in accordance with the objectives 
and principles of the Charter’68. 
 The three recent cases involving the Kingdom of Spain, (1) Masdar 
Solar & Wind Cooperatief U.A. v. The Kingdom of Spain; (2) Charanne 
B.V., Construction Investments S.A.R.L. v Spain; and (3) Eisner 
 
63 Id. at ¶ 362. 
64 Id. at ¶ 43-452. 
65 Id. at ¶ 363 
66 Id. at 441-452. 
67 67 Id. 
68 ECT, supra note 1, at art. 10(1) 
2020] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW 309 
 
Infrastructure Limited and Energia Solar Luxembourg S.a.r.l. v Spain69, 
all shared a similar thread that could be utilized to modernize the ETC and 
provide a more robust definition of FET.  The concepts and conflicts in 
the three Spanish cases reflect recent trends in Energy Arbitrations under 
the ECT and boil down to three key aspects regarding Fair and Equitable 
Treatment.  First, all three tribunals support the notion that in general, 
states have the sovereign right to make changes to their regulatory 
regime.70  Second, in their opinions, each of the three tribunals noted that 
this sovereign right to make regulatory changes could breach FET 
standards toward investors if there was a legitimate expectation created by 
the state that the regulatory regime would not change.71  Third, the 
tribunals in all three cases weighed whether there was a fundamental 
change in the regime to analyze whether there was substantial disparity in 
the investor’s legitimate expectations.72  However, the three tribunals 
differed in what constituted a legitimate expectation.  In Charanne and 
Masdar, the tribunals looked at whether there was a specific commitment 
towards the investor that the legislation would not be changed, as only then 
could would an investor have a legitimate expectation that the regulatory 
regime would not change. The opinions also touched on stability and 
transparency.73  In Eisner, the tribunal focused less on specific 
commitments and more on the general commitment of states to avoid 
radical amendments on key characteristics of the investment that were 
relied upon by investors, as radical changes were enough to constitute a 
breach of FET standards.74 
Providing a stable legal and business environment has been identified 
in several decisions as an essential element of fair and equitable 
treatment.75 Though what a State must do to meet this requirement is not 
 
69  Masdar Solar & Wind Cooperatief U.A., ICSID Case No. ARB/14/1; Eiser 
Infrastructure Ltd., ICSID Case No. ARB/13/36; Charanne B.V., SCC Arb. No.: 062/2012.  
70 Masdar Solar & Wind Cooperatief U.A., ICSID Case No. ARB/14/1; Eiser 
Infrastructure Ltd., ICSID Case No. ARB/13/36; Charanne B.V., SCC Arb. No.: 062/2012. 
71 Masdar Solar & Wind Cooperatief U.A., ICSID Case No. ARB/14/1; Eiser 
Infrastructure Ltd., ICSID Case No. ARB/13/36; Charanne B.V., SCC Arb. No.: 062/2012. 
72 Masdar Solar & Wind Cooperatief U.A., ICSID Case No. ARB/14/1; Eiser 
Infrastructure Ltd., ICSID Case No. ARB/13/36; Charanne B.V., SCC Arb. No.: 062/2012. 
73 Masdar Solar & Wind Cooperatief U.A., ICSID Case No. ARB/14/1; Charanne B.V., 
SCC Arb. No.: 062/2012; see also Saluka Investments, UNICTRAL at ¶ 305. 
74 Eiser Infrastructure Ltd., ICSID Case No. ARB/13/36; CMS Gas Transmission Comp., 
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8 at ¶ 276. 
75 Masdar Solar & Wind Cooperatief U.A., ICSID Case No. ARB/14/1; Occidental 
Petroleum Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador (U.S. v. Ecuador), ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, 
Award, ¶ 183 (Oct. 5, 2012); PSEG Global Inc., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5 at ¶ 253; 
LG&E Energy Corp v. Argentine Republic (U.S. v. Arg.), ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, 
Decision on Liability, ¶¶ 124-5 (Oct. 3, 2006); Saluka Investments, UNICTRAL at ¶ 303; 
CMS Gas Transmission Comp., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8 at ¶¶ 274-6; Enron Creditors 
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fully specified under the ECT, transparency and predictability for 
investors was a major part of all of the Spanish decisions and is referenced 
in many Energy disputes as an integral part component of FET analyses.76   
Although investors cannot reasonably expect that the circumstances at the 
time the investment to be frozen in time and entirely unchanged, “fair and 
equitable treatment is inseparable from stability and predictability” and 
should undoubtedly be weighed in the consideration of FET under ECT.  
For the foregoing reasons, the Energy Charter Treaty should modernize to 
define FET as it pertains to Article 10(1) of the ECT to include stability, 
transparency and legitimate expectations based on commitments in this 
definition in an open-ended list of FET obligations.   
 
 
Recovery Corp. v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3), Decision on 
Jurisdiction, ¶  260 (Aug. 2, 2004). 
76 Masdar Solar & Wind Cooperatief U.A., ICSID Case No. ARB/14/1; Occidental 
Petroleum Corp., ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11 at ¶ 185; Siemens A.G., ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/8 at ¶ 297; GAMI Investments, UNCITRAL at ¶ 88; Tecnicas Medioambientales 
Tecmed S.A., ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2 at ¶ 154; Metalclad Corp., ICSID Case No. 
ARB (AF)/97/1 at ¶ 99. 
 
